Pratt & Whitney F135 Engine

Congressional Debate

"The Department supported the omission of continued funding for the alternate engine (F136) in the Fiscal Year 2009 President's Budget request. The DON maintains there are higher priority needs in the budget and that the risks associated with a single engine supplier continue to be manageable. The three Fiscal Year 2007 Congressionallydirected engine studies have been completed. The conclusions, while supportive of competition in general, reinforced the Department's initial findings that the projected savings from not doing competition outweigh the investment and sustainment costs."
Statement of David Architzel, Principal Deputy Research, Development & Acquisition, U.S. Navy, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, 3/25/09
"Continued funding for the F136 engine carries cost penalties to both F135 and F136 engines for reduced production line learning curves and inefficient economic order quantities. The department has concluded that maintaining a single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. Our belief is the risks associated with a single source engine supplier are manageable due to improvements in engine technology and do not outweigh the investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine."
Statement of Daniel J. Darnell Deputy Chief of Staff,U.S. Air Force, House Air Land Subcommittee, 5/20/09
"Sir, we do support the President's budget and the Department's position on this. In a fiscally con-strained environment the balance of risk versus the benefit of competition is balanced and we think we have a track re-cord in other aircraft that have a single- engine provider to give us confidence that we will have a successful program."
Donald Hoffman, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, USAF, Senate Armed Services Airland Subcommittee 4/9/08
"Yes, sir, just that the Navy and the Department continue to believe that the risk associated with a single-engine supplier are manageable and do not outweigh the investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine."
Rear Admiral Allen Myers, Office of Chief Naval Operations. Senate Armed Services Airland Subcommittee 4/9/08
"The $1.6 billion to develop an alternate engine represents funds that can be used now to buy other needed capability for our war fighters and our nation. Furthermore, the F-136 engine is not derived from the F-119 and presents a risk of technical issues and cost growth during development, another risk to the war fighter's capability."
John J. Young, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Joint Hearing of Air Land & Seapower subcommittee, 3/11/08
"...But the concern is where the money is coming to fund the joint, the dual engine program. And, in fact, in the mark it's clear that the funding is coming out of the hide of the Joint Strike Fighter program, out of R&D and procurement."
Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA) House Appropriations Committee Markup, 5/2/07
"I think the analysis within the de-partment that the CAIG did and then the other two assessments that GAO and IDA did, indicate that it is not at all likely that we would recoup this investment."
William Balderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, 4/26/07
"It is costly to carry a second source. And what you do when you -- when you split a competition like this, of course, if you were to carry the two sources, you end up with lower procurement quantities for each vendor, which increases the per unit cost."
William Balderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, 4/26/07
"So our assessment within the Navy, and I think within the department, is that even some of the reports that have assumed a viable competition and a competitive environment for both sources may be overstated, and it may be more difficult than those reports stated to recoup that investment in a two-source environment."
William Balderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, 4/26/07
"The CAIG finds an alternative engine for the F-35 will not result in a net cost savings. Instead, their analysis shows a net additional cost in both base year 2002 dollars and net present value terms, recognizing a small return on investment in then-year dollars."
David G. Ahern, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, House Air Land Subcommittee, 3/22/07
"Competition and procurement alone cannot be expected to recover this investment."
James P. Woolsey, Institute for Defense Analyses, House Air Land Subcommittee, 3/22/07
"But the fact of the matter is, all of our analysis shows that we never recover the costs of this program."
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/15/06
"If you project that forward, we conclude that in the most optimistic case, we would not save any money until 2025. And in a realistic case, we never recover that cost, much less the cost of a separate supply chain and all the issues associated with having the second engine."
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/15/06
"And the end result, if we are required to fund another engine program, that will impact the basic program. And it will end up delaying and putting the basic program at risk."
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/15/06
"Our conclusion in this analysis is it is not money well spent to have a second engine on Joint Strike Fighter."
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Senate Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/15/06

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