Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee Airland Subcommittee
Combined Statement of Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) and Maj. Gen. Johnny A. Weida, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements
“Your Air Force’s position regarding the JSF alternate engine program is that a second engine is unnecessary, too costly, and risks diverting resources from production. The FY11 Presidential Budget does not request funding for the development and procurement of the F136 alternate engine. The Air Force and Navy continue to execute the funding appropriated by Congress in the previous budgets to continue the F136 program.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation estimated that the Department of Defense will have to fund approximately $2.9 billion to take the F136 engine to competition in FY17, including development, directed buys, and the necessary logistics support. Continued funding for the F136 engine carries cost penalties to both the F135 and F136 engines in the form of reduced production line learning curves and inefficient economic order quantities. The department concludes that maintaining a single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. We believe the risks associated with a single source engine supplier are manageable due to improvements in engine technology and do not outweigh the investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine.
Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) and Maj. Gen. Johnny A. Weida
, 4/13/10
Regarding putting that money to use on that second engine, a general
from the Air Force overseeing this Joint Strike Fighter program
told our committee it would delay the Joint Strike Fighter, which
our services are desperately waiting for. They need this tactical
fighter. So it would delay the program and, in fact, this Air Force
general testified to our committee that putting money into the bill
for the second engine, and continuing to fund it, would result,
over the next 5 years, in a reduced capacity to build Joint Strike
Fighters by 53 planes.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional Record,
7/23/09
Developing a second engine, quite logically and following common
sense, would require the Department of Defense to maintain two
logistics operations to support it--tails, as it is called in
the military, two tails, two sets of training manuals, two sets
of tooling component improvement parts. These additional and unnecessary
expenses would raise operations and sustainment costs for the
Joint Strike Fighter throughout the life cycle of the program.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
I cannot emphasize that enough--53 fewer aircraft that we otherwise
would have purchased for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps that
are desperately in need of them over the next 5 years; 53 fewer
planes because we are going to spend that money buying a second
engine we do not need. That really would be a major disruption to
the Joint Strike Fighter Program.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional
Record, 7/23/09
I hope the great engine war is over. I know of no data or analysis
that supports that taxpayers will see any net savings from subjecting
the engine for the JSF to any further competition.
Senator John
McCain, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
But I suggest the challenge there is to ensure that development
costs leading to production remain stable, not to introduce a new
engine to the program that will most assuredly add more uncertain
testing requirements, complexity, and ultimately cost to the program.
Senator John McCain, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
So I believe the provision currently in the bill would be seriously
disruptive because one of the offsets it uses to fund developing
and buying a second engine derives from research, development, and
testing and evaluation efforts supporting the program itself.
Senator John McCain, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
Remember, Secretary Gates restructured the Joint Strike Fighter
Program this year precisely to provide for more robust developmental
testing over the next 5 years to ensure that the program stays on
its planned budget. Taking money out of the program's research,
development, and testing and evaluation effort will, in my view,
most assuredly disrupt the program.
Senator John McCain, Congressional
Record, 7/23/09
One of the lessons of history on this program is its stability in
funding is absolutely vital to executing that program soundly, the
instability in funding--the disruption that the provision introduces
into the bill--brings the bill within the scope of a veto threat.
Senator John McCain, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
There has been some citing of a GAO report issued in May of this
year that suggested that, in the long term, a second engine might
result in savings. I think it is important to say that the opinion
of the GAO is not documented in their report on that matter, and
it is not shared by other authorities who have done independent
analyses.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
The Institute for Defense Analyses says flat out that GAO underestimated
the required government investment to develop an alternative engine
by nearly $4 billion. One of the supporters of the second engine
earlier said that we have already spent over $2 billion on it, and
there is only a need to spend another $1.5 billion or $1.8 billion.
Of course, any dollar we spend on an engine that I believe we don't
need should go to other programs in the Department of Defense. It
is a waste of dollars.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional Record,
7/23/09
In addition, the Secretaries and Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy
have all said that they do not need or want a second engine for
the JSF. When Air Force Chief of Staff General Schwartz testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 21, 2009, he said
that if he were asked where he would put his next available dollar
for the F-22 program, ``it would not be in a second engine.'' Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead is also opposed to the
second engine, stating, ``..... keeping parts for two engines on
the decks of aircraft carriers is not advisable. Therefore you can
put me solidly in the one-engine camp.
Senator Olympia Snowe,
Congressional Record, 7/23/09
Congress has directed three studies on the alternative engine, and
we have gone over studies in our Armed Services Committee. Two out
of the three studies of the alternate engine stated there would
never be any cost savings associated with the competition.
Senator
Jim Inhofe, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
It seems to me it is a savings without the alternate engine, which
will allow us to have more capability, more aircraft.
Senator
Jim Inhofe, Congressional Record, 7/23/09
Not only do we not need it, the Air Force testified before our committee
that if we spend this money on a second engine, we are going to
get, by General Shackelford's testimony to us, 53 fewer Joint Strike
Fighters in the next 5 years. We will not be able to afford them.
That is a serious consequence.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional
Record, 7/23/09
So I submit to my colleagues, I believe we have shown today that
the second engine funding will seriously disrupt the Joint Strike
Fighter Program.
Senator Joe Lieberman, Congressional Record,
7/23/09
- "First, the Navy supports the Department of Defense position that -- in general while we do support competition, in this case of the alternative engine we view that the cost of continuing with two development programs on that is not offset by the savings that we would see in the future of having those two engines and also having to support both engine types. So the Navy remains supportive of that position of just the 135."
- Admiral David Architzel, USN, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, June 9, 2009.
- "So when we look at that balancing the risk of having one engine versus the costs associated with paying for the second engine, be it one in terms of costs within the program, which would be taken out of production aircraft, a negative effect in terms of unit costs and whatnot, or even having to source those dollars someplace else within the Air Force in this time, we don't consider that to be an affordable solution."
- General Mark Shackelford, USAF, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, June 9, 2009
- "You know, so this has real consequences. This is not -- in a normal case, of course you'd like to have two engines, two engine programs. But you can't have it all. So if you go over the two engines, we're going to be 53 planes short of what we'd otherwise be within that five-year period."
- Senator Joe Lieberman, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, June 9, 2009
- "Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I really can't add much from what was said from General Shackelford. The facts that he presented, I agree with, as well as General Trautman. For the Navy, we just have come through the point where this year we get our first aircraft, which our first four gets delivered on the sea variance. While initially it may not affect those four, it certainly would affect us as we go forward into the FYDB in terms of the developmental aircraft and into production. And it would have an impact on us, both on our cost. At the same time we're talking about ramp rates and managing our strike fighter inventory, this would push things out to the right further, push the IOC out, and then obviously push -- initial operating capability, excuse me, out -- as well as reduce our -- have an impact on our strike fighter count. So that's the same argument I think you just heard."
- Admiral David Architzel, USN, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, June 9, 2009.
- "My own personal conclusion from all this -- and I thank you for the case you've made -- is that we can't afford the second engine, and it will compromise the joint strike fighter program. So I hope we stick with the president's recommendation on that one."
- Senator Joe Lieberman, Senate Air Land Subcommittee, June 9, 2009
- "But I have to tell you that if you asked me where I would put my next marginal dollar, at this point it would not be in a second engine."
- General Norton Schwartz, Air Force Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, 5/21/09
- "The Department did not include funding in the Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget for the F136 competitive engine. The decision to not include funding for the F136 is consistent with the Department's position on this issue for the prior three budget submissions. The decision this year was reviewed by the Department's leadership as well as the Administration. The determination of whether to fund the competitive engine, as it has in the past, was weighed against the budget priorities of the Department as a whole, the optimum use of taxpayer's dollars in executing and preparing for the National defense, and the benefits to the F-35 program."
- David Ahern, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition House Air Land Subcommittee, 5/20/09
- "The CAIG did a study of the benefits of the alternative engine, and the CAIG came to the conclusion that it didn't pencil out, that it takes a pretty substantial initial development cost to develop that second engine, and then you have to split the production so you don't get quite the learning efficiencies between two lines. You balance those costs against the benefits that you get, and we do think you will get some benefits in terms of pricing down the line.And you do a calculation and determine the net present value, and the CAIG came to the conclusion that the initial cost outweighed any benefits that you would get down the line.
- "Similarly, we asked one of the independent federal research centers, the Institute for Defense Analyses, to do a similar analysis, and they came to a similar conclusion."
- Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn, House Armed Services Committee, 5/6/09
- "Those dollars were they sourced out of the existing program, would be at the expense of dollars going towards production of aircraft, which has a side effect of increasing the unit costs on an annual basis for those aircraft making them less affordable at that time. Likewise, the learning curve which has a direct impact on the unit cost of the engines be it the primary engine or an alternate engine gets shallowed (ph) out sooner, therefore, we don't save as much from a learning perspective in the increased production of the original engine. When you factor those items together, the cost benefit does not equal a favorable number."
- Lt. General Mark Shackelford, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, 3/25/09